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INTRODUCTION 
Pensions in the public sector and the increasing costs for providing defined benefit (db) 
retirement plans to public employees is a topic of great concern for many jurisdictions in 
California and across the nation.  In 2009, the City of San Jose faced almost $2 billion dollars in 
unfunded liability for their pension funds (City of San Jose, Office of the Independent Auditor, 
2010).  From fiscal year 90-91 to fiscal year 10-11, the City of San Jose’s contribution to 
employee pensions doubled, from 10% of payroll to over 20% for employees in the Federated 
plan, and from just under 20% to almost 40% for public safety employees (City of San Jose, 
Office of the Independent Auditor, 2010).   
What are jurisdictions doing to solve the problem?  In response to these unfunded 
liabilities and pension plan rate increases, the City of San Jose and other jurisdictions are actively 
exploring options to reduce future pension obligations and pay down the unfunded liability for 
current pension obligations.  Three jurisdictions in various stages of pension changes are the City 
of San Jose, the City of Sacramento and the City of San Diego.  This research compares and 
contrasts different pension reform efforts in the City of San Jose, City of Sacramento and City of 
San Diego.  In particular, this research analyzes fiscal challenges the jurisdictions face, legal 
obstacles to pension reform, potential savings and work place impacts.   
Prior to analyzing various pension plans and respective reform efforts it is useful to 
provide a general background and definition of the terms, such as db plans and defined 
contribution (dc) plans.  In addition, a discussion about pension plan reporting requirements and 
who bears the risk in each type of plan is relevant to this research 
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Terms 
A pension is a form of deferred compensation.  Employees opt to receive a specified 
current salary and an additional salary in the form of regular payments into an investment fund 
that will provide income in retirement.  Some employers pay for the entire cost of the pension, 
while other employers share the cost of future pension payments with the employees.  The rate of 
pension payments in relation to earned salary and years of service is negotiated as part of an 
overall labor contract.  Contributions by employer and employee earn interest, and together these 
three sources provide the financial basis for the post-retirement pension payments. 
Dc plans dictate specific contributions from the employer and the employee.  The payouts 
from these dc plans are not specified and generally depend on the amount contributed by plan 
participants and the investment income generated by these contributions (Mitchell, McCarthy, 
Wisniewski, & Zorn, 2001).  Some commonly recognized dc plans are 401(a), 403(b), employee 
stock and profit sharing plans (Department of Labor, n.d.).  Contributions to dc plans in some 
cases are matched by employers (Department of Labor, n.d.).  Investments in dc plans are self-
directed, meaning the individual plan participant (employee) is responsible for making 
investment choices and bears the risks for any investment losses (CNN Money.com, n.d.).  
Db plans provide a specific monetary benefit to participants based on a formula.  
Typically the formula integrates a participant’s age, years of service and salary at retirement to 
determine the benefits received in retirement (Mitchell, McCarthy, Wisniewski, & Zorn, 2001) 
(Taylor, 2011).  The plans are referred to by their formula: 2% at 55, 2.7% at 60 or 3% at 60, for 
example.  The participant, after vesting in the plan, is eligible for the specified pension upon 
reaching retirement age.  Vesting periods can vary depending on the employee’s classification 
and the plan requirements (Mitchell, McCarthy, Wisniewski, & Zorn, 2001).  In a 2.5% at 55 
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plan, a vested participant, aged 55, would receive 2.5% of his salary (as defined by the plan) 
times his years of service.  The definition of salary base for estimating pension payouts varies, 
such as being an average of several years, the last year’s salary, or salary plus specified additions 
like unused vacation pay and bonuses.  Employers make contributions to the plan and in many 
cases employees make contributions as well (Taylor, 2011).   
The specific employer and employee contributions and make-up of the plan are unique to 
the employer and usually a subject of collective bargaining (Taylor, 2011).  The actual amount of 
annual required contributions is dependent on actuarial assumptions about the plan.  Some 
factors considered in the calculations include the age of plan participants, their years of service, 
pay, mortality of participants, and investment returns. (Hustead & Mitchell, 2001)  In a db plan 
the employer (and by extension the taxpayers) is responsible for investment decisions and any 
losses. (Brown, 2011)   
To determine the health of a db plan, plans often refer to the term “unfunded liability” 
(City of San Jose, Office of the City Manager, 2011).  According to the City of San Jose Fiscal 
and Service Level Emergency (2011) report, the: 
Funded status is determined by comparing the plan’s assets (the money available 
to pay for the benefits) to the present value of the plan’s future liabilities (the 
money which the plan will eventually have to pay out). If Plan Assets (PA) equal 
or exceed the Actuarial Accrued Liability (AAL), then the plan is fully funded. If 
the PA is less than the AAL, then the plan is underfunded. (City of San Jose, 
Office of the City Manager, 2011, p. 44) 
 
Unfunded liabilities are not a new concept.  Many private sector organizations, with db pension 
plans, have experienced unfunded liabilities.  United Airlines had $7.1 billion in unfunded 
liabilities in 2005 when it declared bankruptcy (Brown J. R., 2008).  Fortunately, the employees 
with a pension in the United Airlines plan were protected by pension guarantee insurance of the 
federal government.  Public employees have no such coverage.   
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Pension Liability 
In 1963 when Studebaker-Packard Corporation declared bankruptcy, thousands of 
employees lost their pensions and there was no recourse for those employees.  To protect 
workers’ pensions, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 
1974, and created the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) (Brown, 2008).  The 
PBCG insures pension plan assets, “encourage[s] the continuation and maintenance of private-
sector db pension plans, provide timely and uninterrupted payment of pension benefits, and keep 
pension insurance premiums at a minimum” (Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, 2011).  
However, these guarantees only apply to private sector pension plans (Brown, 2008) (Pension 
Benefit Guarantee Corporation, 2011). 
There is some debate regarding the actual size of the public pension unfunded liability 
problem.  Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) rules require pension plans’ 
liabilities to be reported at a discounted rate (Novy-Marx & Rauh, 2010), however Novy-Marx 
and Rauh contend that such a representation undervalues the actual extent of liabilities faced by 
each jurisdiction.  The City of San Jose calculated its unfunded liability using two methods, the 
market rate and the actuarial method.  The market rate is the current market value of the assets.  
The actuarial rate spreads market gains and losses out over a certain time period in a so-called 
“smoothing” (City of San Jose, Office of the City Manager, 2011, p. 44) of the assets.  Both asset 
calculation methods show a large unfunded liability, but there is a marked difference in the size 
of the liability.   
For City of San Jose Police and Fire pension plan the market rate unfunded liability is $1 
billion and $.65 billion using the actuarial method, while for Federated employees the market 
rate unfunded liability is $.99 billion versus $.78 billion using actuarial calculation (City of San 
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Jose, Office of the City Manager, 2011).  Regardless of the size of the unfunded liability, 
jurisdictions are facing increasing liabilities, and without the safety net of pension guarantee 
insurance it is clear that changes are needed, and the public is very interested in the discussion 
because the financial burden is resulting in loss of direct services, such as library hours.    
As the economy has stagnated, and the State and local jurisdictions are facing years of 
budget deficits, there has been increasing public pressure to review all aspects of public finances.   
Particular scrutiny has been directed to public employee pension plans.  In the past few years 
there have been various news articles describing retirees with pensions over $100,000 per year 
(Taylor, 2011).  These articles, along with increasing unfunded pension liabilities, and cuts to 
public services, have led to the public perception that public pension costs, entitlement, and 
benefits are too generous and must be reduced or modified.  
In October 2011, Governor Jerry Brown released a plan to change pension plans for 
California state workers (Taylor, 2011).  Some of the main points in his twelve point plan 
include changing the cost sharing structure of contributions to pension plans, moving new 
employees to a “hybrid plan” which included a db and dc combination plan, increasing the 
retirement age for new employees, and prohibiting retroactive pension plan increases. (Brown, 
2011)  In November 2011, the Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) provided an analysis and 
response to Brown’s proposals (Taylor, 2011).  The public pressure, partnered with the 
Governor’s plan and corresponding analysis, has put pressure on those cities in the midst of 
pension reform efforts, and may inform their reform decisions.   
Voters have also weighed in at the polls.  A pension reform measure in San Francisco and 
an advisory measure on pension reforms in Modesto, in November 2011, passed with significant 
local support in each jurisdiction (Oney, 2011).  As Oney (2011) points out, these recent ballot 
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results can help jurisdictions contemplating pension reform efforts, such as the cities of San Jose 
and San Diego, to create ballot measures that will meet voter approval and decrease city pension 
costs.   
 To provide context, the United Parcel Service (UPS), a private sector employer, changed 
pension plan providers for Teamsters members, in part due to large unfunded liabilities.  This 
increased employee costs and potentially created an additional decrease in benefits (Greenhouse, 
2007).  The change required approval from the union members, with UPS paying a penalty to 
leave the unfunded plan (Greenhouse, 2007).  This is different than the process allowable in 
public sector pension plans.  
Role of Social Security 
 For all private sector employees in the United States, and many public sector employees, 
there is a federal retirement program commonly called “Social Security.”  Originally public 
agencies were not included in the program, but over the years some public agencies, like the 
California State University system and the City of Sacramento, have joined the Social Security 
system.  In this case the employer and employee pay the standard contributions mandated by the 
federal program, as well as the contributions to any public agency pension program. 
 Social Security payments are covered by a variety of complex regulations.  Retirees who 
have paid adequate amounts into the Social Security system to receive monthly payments, but 
have also derived pensions from any public entity that did not pay onto Social Security, will get a 
reduced Social Security payment compared with a retiree who has worked only in the private 
sector.  This is known as the windfall provision.  Retirees who have worked in private sector jobs 
covered by Social Security and jobs covered by a public pension program cannot get the full 
Social Security payment for the years of private sector employment if they receive a public 
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sector pension. (Social Security Administration, 2012a) 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since public perception is an important aspect of pension reform efforts there is 
increasing political pressure to change public employees’ pensions.  It is useful to know what 
public employees will receive in retirement.  The Social Security Administration website, 
“Information For Government Employees” page, provides information on what a government 
employee can expect in Social Security benefits while drawing a pension from a public sector 
retirement plan.  Employees who participate in the Teamster’s plan do not see an “offset or 
reduction in any Social Security Retirement income” (United Parcel Service, 2011).  Munnell, 
Aubry, Hurwitz, and Quinby (2011) attempt to compare the wealth of retired state-local workers 
versus the wealth of retired private sector workers to determine if one set is wealthier.  This 
comparison concludes that a third of state/local employees who worked more than half their 
career in the public sector had wealthier household income at age 65 than similar families who 
worked in the private sector, and two-thirds of employees who worked less than half their career 
in the public sector were not as wealthy as private sector counterparts, which could further color 
public opinion.   
Hess and Squire (2010) argue that pension plans stifle recruitment and create a stagnant 
atmosphere.  They advise that it is politically difficult to change pension plans because of the 
organized opposition of those vested in the system.  The authors describe what happened in New 
Jersey as a cautionary tale, where a fiscally sound state pension plan was decimated by 
legislative decisions. The legislature enhanced pension benefits in 2000 when the plan had a 
surplus; by 2003 it had turned into a large pension deficit.  In 2004, to make their contributions 
to the pension plans, local jurisdictions raised taxes.  These actions led to a shake-up in the 
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Governor’s race, friction with the public employee unions and eventually resulted in salary and 
benefit concessions.   
Novy-Marx and Rauh (2010), in their journal article “Public Pension Promises: How Big 
Are They and What Are They Worth?”, postulate that current reporting regulations under 
represent the amount of debt and unfunded liability that public pension funds are carrying.  
Using various db plan documents, they attempt to estimate tax-payer liability.  Baker (2011), in 
“The Origins and Severity of the Public Pension Crisis”, examines pension fund assets and 
argues that the economic downturn caused most of the unfunded liability, not systematic 
government underfunding.  In contrast, Borenstein (2011), in his article: “A bad market is just 
part of San Jose's pension problems”, examines the situation in the City of San Jose and 
attributes only a small part of the unfunded liability problem to the economy.  Instead he advises 
that most of the unfunded liability is due to unrecognized costs such as retirees’ living longer, 
retroactive pension increases, and guaranteed cost of living adjustments (Borenstein, 2011).  The 
Pew Center for the States (2010) also provides insight on the unfunded liability of pension plans 
in “The Trillion Dollar Gap: underfunded state retirement systems and the roads to reform”.  
They say that state and local pension systems are facing significant unfunded liabilities due to 
their public policies and political choices, such as benefit increases and underfunding the plans.  
The League of California Cities also studied the California pension problem and substantially 
agrees with other authors that the primary reasons for increased costs of pensions are due to 
recent losses in pension investments, changes to benefit formulas, retirees’ living longer and 
higher salaries (Gould, 2011).   
Another factor to consider is the potential impact of the so called “Currency Wars”, the 
systematic devaluation of national currency to increase exports and create job growth (Keating, 
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2010).  This devaluation of currency could escalate as nations try to keep their competitive 
advantage. (Clancy, 2010)  Retirees in this situation would have less buying power as their 
retirement fund is worth less (Clancy, 2010), but potential increases in the job market and more 
revenue for local jurisdictions could mean smaller unfunded liabilities in pension plans.   
As a counterpoint, Forman (2009), in his journal article “Funding Public Pension Plans”, 
discusses the fundamental differences between dc plans and db plans, options to paying for db 
plans and potential investment strategies.  Jametti (2008), in his journal article “Underfunding of 
Defined Benefit Pension Plans and Benefit Guarantee Insurance: An Overview of Theory and 
Evidence”, describes the problem of adequately funding pension plans in Canada, and provides 
insight into the use of pension guarantee insurance.  He advises that this analysis can be applied 
in numerous jurisdictions.  Kilgour (2009) provides information about pension funding 
mechanisms and employer required contributions.  His conclusion is that California faces serious 
problems with unfunded liabilities in pension and retiree health plans; fixing these problems will 
require long-term solutions, which may increase costs in the short term and buy-in from public 
sector unions.      
There are legal questions that jurisdictions must explore when discussing pension reform.  
Monahan (2010) provides information in her article “Public Pension Plan Reform: The Legal 
Framework”.  She describes the various legal protections and contradictions jurisdictions will 
face in creating, defending and implementing pension reform plans.  The Public Employee’s 
Retirement System (PERS) (2011) provided guidance on questions regarding vesting of PERS 
pension benefits, in their member publication Vested Rights of CalPERS Members: Protecting 
the pension promises made to public employees.  This publication strives to inform PERS 
members about plan provisions that are vested and those that may not be vested.  In November 
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2011, the California Supreme Court ruled that retiree health benefits are vested and cannot be 
changed if there is an implied promise that the jurisdiction wanted to create a lifetime benefit.  
The case has now been remanded to U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals for further review (Dolan, 
2011).  While retiree health benefits are different from pension benefits, it is possible that case 
law created for the retiree health benefits can be applied to the question about the vesting of 
pension benefits.  To provide an employee perspective, former deputy city attorney Brian Doyle 
(2011), in his article “San Jose's assault on vested rights is patently illegal”, vehemently opposes 
arguments that pension benefits are not vested, and claims that any changes to pension plans for 
current employees are illegal. (Doyle, 2011)  
Boyken’s (2008) article, “Actuarially Speaking: A Plain Language Summary of Actuarial 
Methods and Practices for Public Employee Pension and Other Post-Employment Benefits”, 
provides a basic guide to pension calculation methods, benefits calculations for public officials 
and other stakeholders involved in public sector pension policy making.  The article includes 
information about actuarial methods, policies and assumptions.  The League of California Cities 
also provides guiding principles for reform.  They advocate plans which appeal as a recruitment 
tool, are sustainable, share costs between employers and employees, and are portable with other 
similarly situated jurisdictions (Gould, 2011).  Included in their guiding principle document are 
pension plan changes that can happen now which will save money in the near future, and other 
changes that will require legislative action (Gould, 2011). 
On a national level, the National Association of State Retirement Administrators 
(NASRA) created a matrix of retirement plan benefits in the USA.  It includes information about 
the current contribution rates, benefits, early retirement options, actuarial methods, and any 
recommendations for study or changes (National Association of State Retirement 
Page 12 of 85 
Administrators, 2010).  Rauh’s (2010) article, “Are State Public Pensions Sustainable? Why the 
Federal Government Should Worry About State Pension Liabilities”, discusses potential dates 
State pension plan funds could be exhausted if changes are not made, and how assumptions 
regarding the funding calculations could be masking the severity of the problem.   
Pension plans are subject to oversight from their respective jurisdictions and many plan 
documents can be found on their respective websites.  Additionally, the jurisdictions themselves 
are subject to oversight from the State.  The Little Hoover Commission (LHC) “…investigate[s] 
state government operations and – through reports, recommendations and legislative proposals – 
promotes efficiency, economy and improved service” (Little Hoover Commission:, n.d.).  The 
LHC is studying the long term costs of California public pensions and their effect on State and 
local finances.  The Commission’s agenda, meeting minutes and public testimony provide 
valuable insight into the pension systems in California (Little Hoover Commission:, n.d.).  The 
commission meets periodically and accepts testimony from various stakeholders.  Jon H. Hamm, 
CEO of California Association of Highway Patrolmen (CHP), responded to questions posed by 
the LHC.  His response discusses the CHP retirement formula, the union’s support of changes in 
retirement costs and its responsibility to partner with the State in finding fiscally responsible 
options for funding pension benefits.  Mr. Hamm’s viewpoint provides an alternative perspective 
to City and State opinions on pension reform (Hamm, 2010). 
Bartel and Associates, a firm specializing in actuarial consulting services primarily on 
retiree health and pension plans, provided the LHC with information regarding California public 
pension issues.  They analyzed three questions about the California pension systems: 1) If 
pension enhancements had not taken place in 2000 what would the scale of the problem be 
today? 2) How bad will the problem get? and 3) a description of actuarial best practices. (Bartel 
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and Associates, 2010) 
David Crane, Special Advisor to the Governor for Jobs and Economic Growth, testified 
at the April 22, 2010 LHC meeting.  His supporting documents included Government Finance 
Officers Association (GFOA) recommendations for best practices for boards governing 
retirement plans and sustainable plan design.  The best practices document outlines responsibility 
of a retirement board and advises jurisdictions to create a manual, governing polices, a code of 
ethics, and provides guidance on the size and scope of the board (Government Finance Officers 
Association (GFOA), 2010).  He also presented a document entitled “New Normal” Retirement 
Plan Design, where the authors, Miller and Link, outline a strategic plan for jurisdictions that 
wish to implement changes to their retirement plans.  They outline diagnostic questions, reasons 
why plans are unsustainable, and how to reform plans (Miller & Link, 2010). 
City of San Jose Mayor Chuck Reed provided testimony to the LHC about the City’s 
pension system and its responses to increased pension costs.  He testified that the City of San 
Jose’s general fund grew by 21% in the last ten years, while the average cost per employee 
increased by 87%.  The mayor discussed two ballot measures, Measures V and W proposed in 
2010.  Measure V changed the City of San Jose charter with regards to arbitration for police and 
fire unions.  Measure W allows the City to implement a two tiered pension system.  (Reed, 2010)  
In May 2011, the City of San Jose contemplated declaring a state of fiscal emergency in 
advance of placing a measure about pension reform on the ballot.  The fiscal emergency 
declaration and ballot measure were postponed for six months to allow time for the City to 
negotiate pension plan changes with the various bargaining units.  Those negotiations failed; the 
city council was set to discuss the fiscal emergency and the ballot measure at their December 6, 
2011 Council Meeting (Figone, 2011b), but improvement in the city’s financial status led the 
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council to postpone the discussions until spring, with the plan for a June ballot measure 
(Woolfolk, 2011a).  The Fiscal and Service Level Emergency Report: An Evaluation of 
Conditions in the City of San Jose (2011) provides a history of the economic conditions and 
budget impacts for the City of San Jose, and describes the proposed new pension plans.  One of 
the proposals for retirement benefits for new employees was to create a three-part retirement 
plan, where one part is participation in Social Security, the second is a dc plan and the third is a 
lower level db plan.  In the initial proposal, current employees could elect to stay in the current 
plan and pay a higher amount or elect to opt-in to the lower plan (City of San Jose, Office of the 
City Manager, 2011).  The opt-in plan could prove problematic because during the past six years, 
the Social Security Administration has not ruled the on request for tax exemptions for plans with 
opt-in provisions (San Jose Mercury News Editorial Board, 2011). 
In Santa Clara County, the Civil Grand Jury produced a report that reviewed the growing 
cost of employee compensation, including pension obligations.  The Santa Clara County Civil 
Grand Jury report looks at cost of employee compensation and changes in revenue and services 
in the fifteen cities of Santa Clara County.  The report criticized changes in employee 
compensation that led to long-term unfunded obligations.  The report admonished cities to 
negotiate changes in employee costs to better correspond with city revenue.  The cities were 
required to respond to the Grand Jury Questions (Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury, 2010).  
The City of San Jose’s response outlined projected budget shortfalls, revenue growth and 
employee costs.  Half of the responses focus on employee benefit costs.  There are diagrams on 
changes in pension contribution rates and it describes the City of San Jose’s thoughts on pension 
obligations and strategies for employee cost containment (City of San Jose, 2010a). 
The fiscal year 2010-2011 City of San Jose budget provides information on the need for 
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service cuts, projection on employee costs, and cost containment strategies.  It includes an 
extensive breakdown on current costs per employee and the other fiscal challenges faced by the 
city (City of San Jose, 2010b).  The budget information from the City of San Diego and City of 
Sacramento provides similar information.   
The City of San Jose Office of the Independent Auditor studied both of the City of San 
Jose’s retirement plans.  The audit focused on increases in benefit costs due to pension 
enhancements, made worse by declining economic circumstances.  The audit advises that 
pension costs could lead to a decrease in City services, and that the unfunded pension liabilities 
are getting bigger.  The audit cites two reasons for increased costs: the age of retirees and 
guaranteed cost of living adjustments.  It also has a section on alternatives to reduce pension 
costs, such as higher employee contributions, adding a tiered retirement plan, and other legal and 
procedural changes (City of San Jose, Office of the Independent Auditor, 2010). 
Woolfolk describes a City of San Jose stakeholder group tasked with studying the City of 
San Jose structural deficit and options to create an “affordable retirement benefit plan”.  This 
article provides insights on the labor view of city structural deficits and potential changes to 
retirement plan options (Woolfolk, 2010). 
The City of San Diego’s pension problems are infamous.  A New York Times article 
(2004) likens the San Diego pension problems to Enron in “San Diego Finds Itself being Viewed 
as a Kind of Enron-By-The-Sea”.  Lowenstein’s book While America Aged: How Pension Debts 
Ruined General Motors, Stopped the NYC Subways, Bankrupted San Diego, and Loom As the 
Next Financial Crisis (2008) discusses excessive benefits provided to City employees, the risks 
taken by the City Treasurer, and the aftermath of decisions made by the Employees Retirement 
System Board.   
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The San Diego Pension Reform Committee (SDPRC), created by the Mayor and 
approved by the city council,  “address[es] concerns about the current unfunded liability of the 
San Diego City Employees Retirement System (CERS)” (City of San Diego, n.d.).  The SDPRC 
website includes documents about the creation of the committee, various historical documents, 
the committee’s final report, the City Manager's action plan and analysis, and a minority report.   
In his article “San Diego needs fundamental pension reform”, McMahon (2004) discusses 
the San Diego pension plan and its unfunded liability.  Additionally, many groups in San Diego 
are fighting for pension reforms (10News.com, 2011).  The Comprehensive Pension Reform 
(CPR) for San Diego group gathered signatures to get a pension reform measure on the June 
2012 ballot.  Their website had information concerning the ballot initiative and their campaign 
(Comprehensive Pension Reform for San Diego, n.d).  
In the City of Sacramento, the Mayor called for police officers to agree to pension 
changes in order to mitigate layoffs (Lillis, 2011).  The City of Sacramento participates in the 
Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS) (City of Sacramento Human Resources, n.d.).  
The PERS website has specific information about the City of Sacramento pension plans.  The 
City of Sacramento report, “Audit of Employee Health and Pension Benefits”, provides 
information about the City’s benefits and presents recommendations for changes to the pension 
plan (City of Sacramento, Office of the City Auditor, 2011).  There are various news articles that 
discuss potential pension reform efforts in the City of Sacramento.  Also in the 1990’s there was 
a court case between the City of Sacramento and PERS regarding implementation of enhanced 
pension benefits without electing it (City of Sacramento v. Public Employees' Retirement 
System, 1994) which  provides historical perspective on the City of Sacramento pension plan.   
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METHODOLOGY 
With the economic downturn, all public expenditures are being scrutinized, with 
particular emphasis on taxpayer-backed expenses without dedicated funding sources, or those 
that are susceptible to economic changes.  The first part of this research project examined what 
the pension obligations are and what they are projected to be for three similarly situated 
jurisdictions in California: the City of San Jose, the City of San Diego and the City of 
Sacramento.   
For this research project, the reform efforts in the City of San Jose are benchmarked 
against the City of San Diego and the City of Sacramento.  While all three jurisdictions are in 
different stages of pension reform efforts and have different political climates, they all have to 
operate within the same state constitutional framework, are covered by the same state and federal 
court decisions, and are of similar size.  In analyzing the different reform efforts it was useful to 
understand the political and economic climate of each jurisdiction.  An understanding of the 
political climate can be developed from newspaper articles about the jurisdictions.  The 
discussion of the political climate includes information about the jurisdiction’s union activity and 
its involvement in the jurisdiction’s decision making process.  Economic conditions of the cities 
can be determined from their budget documents, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report 
(CAFR) and various financial audits, where available.  All of these documents were available 
from the respective jurisdiction’s website or finance department.  
The heart of the analysis is to determine if the reform efforts in the three cities have made 
or will make a difference in the current and future pension obligations.  Some of the indicators of 
this difference in pension obligations are data that shows if there is a reduction in employer 
contribution rates, if there is a reduction in the unfunded liability, if the jurisdiction has been able 
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to reduce future pension obligations by implementing additional retirement tiers, and whether the 
jurisdiction has achieved concessions from bargaining units.  Some examples of concessions 
could be increasing employee contributions to pension plan rates, increasing contributions to 
other benefits, and changing COLA or other retirement benefit options.  If changes have been 
implemented, this data will be available in the city council reports and/or reports of the 
retirement board.  
There are a number of ways jurisdictions can approach the pension obligations.  Some 
options for the jurisdictions to explore are: to do nothing, implement a different type of plan, 
change benefits for current employees, or reduce or eliminate cost of living adjustments. 
Information about the pension rates, plan design, and projection models is public information 
which is available on the respective jurisdictions’ websites or through the respective 
jurisdictions’ retirement or human resources departments.   
 The goal of the benchmarking research is to provide useful information for California 
cities confronting the long term implications of the current pension systems.  Findings are 
developed to analyze whether what the jurisdictions are doing will make a difference to their 
future pension obligations, and if one of the processes has produced a better outcome than 
another.   
FINDINGS  
 
City of San Jose 
The City of San Jose is located in the San Francisco Bay Area; it is the seat of Santa 
Clara County and comprises over 175 square miles of land (US Census Bureau, 2012).  With 
nearly one million people, it is the third largest city in the State of California (California 
Department of Finance, Demographic Research Unit, 2012).  The City is racially diverse, 
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approximately 28% is White, 32% Asian, and 33% of Hispanic origin (US Census Bureau, 2012) 
(City of San Jose, Office of the City Manager, n.d.).  Over 80% of the City’s population has 
graduated from high school, with a median household income of $79,405 (US Census Bureau, 
2012).   
The City of San Jose is a Charter City (City of San Jose, n.d.).  Per Article II, Section 200 
of the Charter, the City has the “power to make and enforce all laws and regulations in respect to 
municipal affairs, subject only to such restrictions and limitations as may be provided in this 
Charter and in the Constitution of the State of California” (City of San Jose, 2010).  As of April 
10, 2012, there were 5,180 full time equivalent (FTE) represented employees for the City of San 
Jose, of which 1,730 are safety employees (City of San Jose, Office of Employee Relations, 
2012), with a total position count of 5,470 (City of San Jose, Office of the City Manager, n.d.).  
For comparison purposes, the count in FY 2001-2002 was nearly 7,500 positions (City of San 
Jose, Office of the City Manager, n.d.).  
The safety employees are members of the International Firefighters, Local 230 and the 
San Jose Police Officers’ Association (City of San Jose, Office of Employee Relations, 2012).  
The remaining 3,450 FTEs are members of various bargaining units, some of which include the 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Confidential Employees’ Organization, and 
Municipal Employees’ Federation (City of San Jose, Office of Employee Relations, 2012).  
There are a total of eleven bargaining groups plus an unrepresented unit (City of San Jose, Office 
of Employee Relations, 2012). 
According to the CAFR for the Federated Plan, there are 2,976 retired members as of 
June 30, 2011 (City of San Jose, Department of Retirement Services, 2011a, p. 121).  The 
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number of retirees includes members who have service retirements, disability retirements, and 
those connected with deferred vesting (Maria Loera, personal communication, April 30 2012).   
The Fire and Police retirement system’s CAFR describes eight categories of retirees, 
including ex-spouses and survivors.  The total number of safety retirees effective June 30, 2011 
is 1,637 (City of San Jose, Department of Retirement Services, 2011b, p. 127),  which includes 
retirees with regular service retirement, disability retirements, early retirement and those with 
deferred vesting (Maria Loera, personal communication, April 30 2012). 
The City of San Jose’s budget for fiscal year 2012-2013 is over $2.6 billion dollars (City 
of San Jose, Office of the City Manager, n.d.).  Nearly $883 million of the budget supports 
general fund departments, such as the Library, Finance, Police and Fire departments.  
Approximately $1.4 billion of the budget is for enterprise fund departments that raise most of 
their own revenues from fees and charges, such as the Airport, Waste Water Treatment Plan and 
Sanitary Sewer fund (City of San Jose, Office of the City Manager, n.d.).  Over 60% of the 
City’s revenue is generated from property tax (26%), sales tax (20%), and utility taxes and 
franchise fees (17%) (City of San Jose, Office of the City Manager, n.d.). 
There are three retirement plans for City of San Jose employees.  The Federated City 
Employees' Retirement System (Federated) covers all full-time, non-safety employees (City of 
San Jose, Department of Retirement Services, 2011a) also known as “miscellaneous employees”, 
the Police and Fire Department Retirement plan (PFDR) covers police and fire employees, and a 
plan through PERS covers City of San Jose Council members (Woolfolk, 2012a). 
The employee contribution rates range from 8% to over 16%.  Specifically, as of June 26, 
2011 the employee contribution rate for miscellaneous employees is 11.20% of the base salary 
(City of San Jose Federated City Employees’ Retirement System, Benefits Summary, 2011).  
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Some employees may pay a different amount depending on the provisions of their union contract 
(City of San Jose, Department of Retirement Services, 2011a).  The employee contribution rate 
as of June 26, 2011, for police safety employees is 17.47% of the base salary (City of San Jose 
Police and Fire Department Retirement Plan, Benefits Summary, 2011a).  The fire employee 
contribution rate to the pension plan is 15.62% of the base salary (City of San Jose Police and 
Fire Department Retirement Plan, Benefits Summary, 2011b).  The employee contribution rate to 
the PERS plan is 8% (Sarah Nunes, Personal Communication, March 22, 2012). 
The City of San Jose’s contributions to the pension plans are significantly higher than the 
employee contributions, ranging from 15% to over 50% of the base salary.  The employer 
contribution to the Federated plan, effective June 26, 2011, is 35.50% of the base salary (City of 
San Jose Federated City Employees’ Retirement System, Benefits Summary, 2011).  The City’s 
contribution to the police employee retirement plan is 56.90% of the base salary effective June 
26, 2011 (City of San Jose Police and Fire Department Retirement Plan, Benefits Summary, 
2011a).  The City’s contribution to the fire employee retirement plan, effective June 26, 2011, is 
56.32% of the base salary (City of San Jose Police and Fire Department Retirement Plan, 
Benefits Summary, 2011b).  The employer contribution rate to the PERS plan is 15.33% (Sarah 
Nunes, Personal Communication, March 22, 2012). 
The city and employee contributions to the various retirement plans have steadily 
increased.  In 2010, the City released tables to illustrate the increase in contribution rates over the 
last decade.  Tables 1, 2 and 3 show the city and employee contribution rates for Federated, 
Police and Fire employees.  
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Table 1: Federated Employees’ Retirement System Contribution Rates 
 
(City of San Jose, Office of Employee Relations, 2010a) 
 
Table 2: Police & Fire Department Retirement Plan (Police Contribution Rates) 
 
(City of San Jose, Office of Employee Relations, 2010c) 
 
Table 3: Police & Fire Department Retirement Plan (Fire Contribution Rates) 
 
(City of San Jose, Office of Employee Relations, 2010b) 
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Pension plan designs and benefit formulas are unique to jurisdictions and the benefit 
options vary by represented unit.  In San Jose, miscellaneous “[m]embers may retire at age 55 
with five or more years of service or at any age with 30 years of service.  The monthly retirement 
allowance payable is the Final Average Salary multiplied by 2.5% per year of service (Maximum 
Benefit: 75% of the Final Average Salary)” (City of San Jose, Department of Retirement 
Services, 2011a, p. 18).  Employees in this plan also have reciprocity with PERS (City of San 
Jose, Department of Retirement Services, 2011a), meaning their years of service with the City 
plan can be used in conjunction with PERS years of service when calculating their retirement 
benefits.   
The plan design and benefit formulas are more complicated for City of San Jose police 
and fire employees.  The benefit formula for police and fire employees changes depending on the 
employee’s date of hire (City of San Jose, Department of Retirement Services, 2011b), and is 
dependent on the employee’s years of service and retirement date.  Specifically, the Police and 
Fire Department Retirement Plan CAFR states:  
An employee who reaches the normal retirement age of 55 with 20 years 
of service; an employee of age 50 with 25 years of service; an employee of 
any age with 30 years of service; or an employee of age 70 with no service 
requirement is entitled to a monthly retirement allowance equal to the final 
compensation multiplied by 2.5% multiplied by years of service up to 30 
years (Maximum benefit, 75% of final average salary) if the employee 
retired prior to February 4, 1996. After February 4, 1996 but prior to 
February 4, 2000, the monthly allowance consists of final compensation 
multiplied by 2.5% for the first 20 years of service, by 3% for the next ten 
years (Maximum benefit, 80% of final average salary). After February 4, 
2000, the monthly allowance consists of final compensation multiplied by 
2.5% for the first 20 years of service, by 3% for the next five years of 
service, by 4% for the next 5 years of service (Maximum benefit, 85% of 
final average salary). Effective July 1, 2006, the monthly allowance for 
Police members only consists of final compensation multiplied by 2.5% 
for the first 20 years of service and by 4% for the next 10 years of service 
(Maximum benefit, 90% of final average salary). Effective July 1, 2008 
for Fire members only, the monthly allowance for a service retirement 
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consists of final average salary multiplied by 2.5% for the first 20 years of 
service. For Fire members with 20 or more years of service, allowance for 
a service retirement consisting of final average salary multiplied by 3.0% 
for each year (maximum benefit, 90% of final average salary).  (City of 
San Jose, Department of Retirement Services, 2011b, p. 18) 
 
In addition to the db plan, the City of San Jose offers a deferred compensation plan, also 
called a 457 plan, to its employees (City of San Jose, Human Resources Department, 2012) and a 
Mandatory Contribution plan for part time, temporary and contract employees (City of San Jose, 
Human Resources Department, n.d.). 
The City of San Jose does not participate in Social Security (City of San Jose, 
Department of Retirement Services, 2007).  Therefore, the employees are subject to the windfall 
elimination provisions as well as the governmental pension offset, which applies to the spouses 
or dependents of the retired employee (City of San Jose, Department of Retirement Services, 
2007). 
According to the 2010-2011 Police and Fire plan CAFR, the investment rate return 
assumption was 7.75% (City of San Jose, Department of Retirement Services, 2011b) and for the 
Federated plan it was 7.95% (City of San Jose, Department of Retirement Services, 2011a).  
Recently, actuaries for the plans recommended changing the assumption rate to 7.25%, but the 
city council decided to set the assumption rate at 7.5% (Sarah Nunes, Personal Communication, 
March 22, 2012).  
As of June 30, 2011, the Police and Fire plan had over $2.6 billion dollars in net assets 
(City of San Jose, Department of Retirement Services, 2011b, p. 28) and the Federated plan had 
over $1.7 billion dollars in net assets (City of San Jose, Department of Retirement Services, 
2011a, p. 26).  Plan assets fluctuate daily as the plans realize investment gains and losses, 
therefore the Civil Grand Jury’s estimate that the City of San Jose plans have approximately $4 
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billion dollars in assets (Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury, 2012) is likely a good 
approximation of the current plan assets.   
The City of San Jose anticipates that the fiscal year 2014-2015 annual contribution will 
be approximately $319 million dollars, or employer contribution rates of 78% for police and fire 
employees and 65% for federated employees (City of San Jose v San Jose Police Officers’ 
Association; San Jose Firefighters IAFF Local 230; Municipal Employees’ Federation, 
AFSCME, Local 101; City Association of Management Personnel, IFPTE, Local 21, 2012) (pg. 
6).  When discussions of the required contributions and pension efforts began in January 2011, 
the projected cost was over $400 million (Figone, 2012a).  Through the discussion process, an 
off the cuff comment seemed to indicate the city’s contribution could be upwards of $650 
million dollars (Figone, 2012a).  Considering the number of assumptions required to create the 
pension fund projections, changes in the projected shortfall are expected.  However, the City of 
San Jose faces increasing media scrutiny and pressure to explain the changes in the projected 
contribution to pension plans.  As a result, legislators in the California State Assembly called for 
an independent audit of the pension system (City of San Jose, Office of Mayor Chuck Reed, 
2012) in part, according to Assemblyman Ricardo Lara, “to make sure the numbers the city is 
using are actually correct” (Woolfolk, 2012c).  In response to these reports, officials with the 
City of San Jose released a detailed memo, with a timeline, illustrating how their discussion of an 
anticipated pension shortfall has been consistent (Figone, 2012a), yet a recent investigative 
report continues to question the conduct of City officials during the pension reform discussions 
(Susko, Putnam, & Villarreal, 2012).   
The City of San Jose is in a politically contentious climate, with Mayor Reed advocating 
for a fiscal reform platform (City of San Jose, Office of Mayor Chuck Reed, n.d.) (Figone, Fiscal 
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reform plan, managers budget addendum #1, 2011a), while his methods are generally opposed by 
the unions (Stevens, 2011).  Communication issues between the city and the unions have resulted 
in long, drawn out, public arguments about scope, scale and implementation of fiscal reform 
efforts (Saillant & Perry, 2012).  Over the past three years the City of San Jose has provided 
many documents about the state of their pension finances.  The increase in pension payment 
obligations as a function of payroll is one of the main reasons that precipitated the call for 
pension plan reforms in the City of San Jose (Reed, 2011) (Figone, 2012a).  Estimates for the 
total retirement costs in the next few years vary.  According to the City Manager’s Retirement 
Projections Fact Sheet, in fiscal year 2015-2016 the total obligation for retirement costs is 
approximately $400 million dollars (Figone, 2012a).   
The City of San Jose negotiated with the bargaining units to make changes to the pension 
plans, but the parties were unable to come to agreement (City of San Jose, Office of Mayor 
Chuck Reed, n.d.).  To address the obligations, on March 6, 2012, the San Jose City Council 
voted on modified language for a pension reform ballot measure.  The measure they discussed 
sets parameters for another pension plan tier for new employees, requires current employees to 
pay more towards their pension plans or move to the new lower tier plan, allows the city to 
suspend cost-of-living-increases in times of fiscal emergency, and requires voter approval for 
any increases to pension benefits (Woolfolk, 2012b) (Reed, 2012).  The requirement to increase 
contribution or move to a lower retirement plan for current employees would not take effect until 
June 23, 2013, allowing the City to verify the legality of the measure prior to its implementation 
(City of San Jose v San Jose Police Officers’ Association; San Jose Firefighters IAFF Local 230; 
Municipal Employees’ Federation, AFSCME, Local 101; City Association of Management 
Personnel, IFPTE, Local 21, 2012).  The San Jose City Council’s approval of the ballot language 
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for the June 2012 primary, changing City pension plans, generated various pension plan option 
reports, public testimony (San Jose Mercury News Editorial Board, 2012) and a lawsuit. 
Four taxpaying, registered voters of San Jose argued the language of the ballot measure, 
as approved by the city council, was misleading and partial towards passage, rather than being 
neutral (McDonough, et al. vs City of San Jose, et al., 2012).  A Superior Court judge agreed and 
ordered the City of San Jose to change the title of the measure from “Pension Reform” to 
“Pension Modification” and change all references to “reform” in the description to “modify” 
(McDonough, et al. vs City of San Jose, et al., 2012).  The intent of the ruling was to make the 
description impartial, as required by Elections Code and the City Charter (McDonough, et al. vs 
City of San Jose, et al., 2012). 
Once the revised measure was placed on the ballot, on May 1, 2012 the City of San Jose 
Council tried to implement a second retirement tier for new employees through the approval of 
the last, best and final offer on various bargaining units (City of San Jose, City Council Agenda 
May 1, 2012 Synopsis, n.d.) (Woolfolk, 2012d).  After a spirited discussion, the item failed and 
was referred back to committee to be re-agendized at a future meeting date (City of San Jose, 
City Council Agenda May 1, 2012 Synopsis, n.d.).  Re-agendizing this item essentially 
postponed action on the second tier until after the June 2012 election (City of San Jose, City 
Council Agenda May 1, 2012 Synopsis, n.d.). 
Over one million dollars (Woolfolk, 2012e) was spent by the campaigns supporting and 
opposing the measure. In the end, the ballot measure passed (Woolfolk, 2012f), with 69.02% of 
the voters selecting “yes” on the measure (Seipel, 2012b).  Following passage of the ballot 
measure, the City again moved to implement a second tier retirement plan.   
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On June 12, 2012, the San Jose City Council approved Agenda Items 3.7 through 3.16 
which imposed the last, best and final offer on the following bargaining units:    
• Association of Building, Mechanical and Electrical Inspectors (ABMEI);  
• Association of Engineers and Architects, International Federation of Professional 
and Technical Engineers, Local 21, Units 041 and 042;  
• Association of Engineers and Architects, International Federation of Professional 
and Technical Engineers, Local 21, Unit 043;  
• Association of Legal Professionals of San Jose (ALP);  
• Association of Maintenance Supervisory Personnel, International Federation of 
Professional and Technical Engineers, Local 21 (AMSP);  
• City Association of Management Personnel (CAMP);  
• International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers, Local 21; 
• International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 332 (IBEW);  
• International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 3 (OE3);  
and implemented similar terms for unrepresented employees. Together, the unrepresented group 
and the various bargaining units listed comprise all of the employee groups in the Federated 
retirement plan (City of San Jose, Office of the City Clerk, 2012).  The council action, 
precipitated by approval of Measures V, W and B, created a second tier retirement plan for new 
employees and significantly changed the health care options available to retirees, current and 
future employees.   
The health plan changes added a new high deductible plan with lower premiums that 
could save between $10 million to $11 million dollars.  These cost savings would be shared 
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equally between the City and the employees (Figone, Supplemental Information for Items 3.3 to 
3.12 on April 27, 2012 City Council Meeting, 2012b).   
The new retirement tier offers lower benefits, specifically non-safety employees hired on 
or after July 1, 2012, will participate in a 2% at 65 db plan (Figone, 2012c), a retirement age that 
is ten years higher than the retirement age for current employees.  The maximum pension amount 
for participants in the second tier is 65% of final compensation.  The cost of living increases in 
retirement will be tied to inflation and capped at 1.5% (Figone, 2012c).  It is anticipated that the 
employer contribution to the second tier plan will be significantly lower than the contributions 
for the current retirement tier, especially since the employer and employee share equally in the 
costs associated with the plan (Figone, 2012c).   
According to Bartel and Associates, the City’s actuary, the normal costs for the second 
tier could be between 13.8% to 15.9%, meaning the City’s cost would be between 6.9% to 7.95% 
(Figone, 2012c). These figures assume that the demographics of the second tier are similar to the 
demographics of the employees hired in the last five years, thus the estimated rates are subject to 
change (Figone, 2012c). 
While written documents indicate the second tier will apply to employees hired after July 
1, 2012, the second tier plan still must be reviewed by the Federated Retirement Board, and the 
city council must approve a City ordinance implementing the new tier (City of San Jose Council 
Meeting, June 12, 2012).  It is only after the ordinance is passed that the second tier will apply to 
new employees (City of San Jose Council Meeting, June 12, 2012).  Any savings from the 
second tier are delayed until the implementation.  The City of San Jose was in negotiation with 
the safety bargaining units to implement a second tier for new safety employees.  However, the 
parties did not reach agreement and are pursuing arbitration on this item (Woolfolk, 2012g).  The 
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Council action does not address the most contentious part of the ballot measure, in which 
pension plans or plan contributions for current employees will be changed on a prospective basis.   
On June 5, 2012, the City filled a complaint for declaratory relief (City of San Jose v San 
Jose Police Officers’ Association; San Jose Firefighters IAFF Local 230; Municipal Employees’ 
Federation, AFSCME, Local 101; City Association of Management Personnel, IFPTE, Local 21, 
2012).  This suit requests that the Court determine if Measure B violates the contracts clause of 
both the Federal and State constitutions, due process guarantees and infringes on vested rights.  
The City argues that Measure B is a cost containment vehicle and its implementation avoids 
putting the City’s benefit program in financial risk, and that the measure does not impinge on 
constitutional and vested rights (City of San Jose v San Jose Police Officers’ Association; San 
Jose Firefighters IAFF Local 230; Municipal Employees’ Federation, AFSCME, Local 101; City 
Association of Management Personnel, IFPTE, Local 21, 2012).  Further, the City argues that the 
San Jose City Charter allows for modifications to the retirement plans (City of San Jose v San 
Jose Police Officers’ Association; San Jose Firefighters IAFF Local 230; Municipal Employees’ 
Federation, AFSCME, Local 101; City Association of Management Personnel, IFPTE, Local 21, 
2012).   
Opponents of the measure sued the city on behalf of current Fire employees and retirees, 
contending that Measure B violates their property rights and fails to provide compensation for 
the taking of said property rights (Robert Sapien, Mary Kathleen McCarthy, Thanh Ho, Randy 
Sekany and Ken Heredia v City of San Jose, Debra Figone, Does 1-15, the Board of 
Administration for the 1961 San Jose Police and Fire Department Retirement Plan, 2012).  The 
San Jose Police Officers’ Association (SJPOA), in a separate suit, argues that Measure B 
abridges their contract and property rights, violates the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA), and 
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contains provisions that discourage employees from exercising their free speech rights and 
circumvents the Court’s authority to address and remedy illegal provisions of the measure (San 
Jose Police Officers’ Association v City of San Jose, Board of Administration for Police and Fire 
Department Retirement Plan of City of San Jose and Does 1-10, 2012).    
Another obstacle is that the opt-in provision for the current employees requires review 
and approval by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (City of San Jose v San Jose Police Officers’ 
Association; San Jose Firefighters IAFF Local 230; Municipal Employees’ Federation, 
AFSCME, Local 101; City Association of Management Personnel, IFPTE, Local 21, 2012), due 
to a 2006 IRS ruling that has tax implication for lower tier plans (Steyer, 2011).  There is no time 
frame for when such approval, if any, would be provided.  Orange County created a hybrid 
pension plan in 2009, part dc, and part db for new employees, and negotiated with their unions to 
allow current employees to opt-in to the new plans, subject to IRS approval.  To date, Orange 
County has not received IRS approval for current employees to move into the less expensive 
pension plan (San Diego Union Tribune Editorial Board, 2012).   
Unlike the Orange County plan, the City of San Jose pension reform plan has built in a 
fail-safe measure.  If IRS approval is not achieved, employees will be required to contribute up 
to 16% of pay towards the unfunded liabilities in addition to normal employee contribution to the 
pension plan.  If the Court deems the pension measure to be illegal, then employees’ salaries will 
be reduced up to 16% (City of San Jose v San Jose Police Officers’ Association; San Jose 
Firefighters IAFF Local 230; Municipal Employees’ Federation, AFSCME, Local 101; City 
Association of Management Personnel, IFPTE, Local 21, 2012).   
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City of Sacramento 
The City of Sacramento, located in the heart of California, is the seat of government for 
the state.  The City has a land area over 97 square miles, and the demographics are over 34% 
White, 26% Hispanic, 18% Asian and over 14% Black (US Census Bureau, 2012a). Similar to 
San Jose, over 80% of Sacramento’s residents have a high school diploma (US Census Bureau, 
2012a).  The median income in the City of Sacramento is $50,267 annually, with 17% below the 
poverty level (US Census Bureau, 2012a).  
For fiscal year 2012-2013 the City has a proposed budget of $1.6 billion dollars (City of 
Sacramento, Finance Department, n.d.).  The general fund is $365 million dollars, while the rest 
of the budget is comprised of various enterprise funds, including “Parking Fund, Water Fund, 
Wastewater Fund, Solid Waste Fund, Marina Fund, Community Center Fund and Storm 
Drainage Fund” (City of Sacramento, Finance Department, n.d.).  Almost 60% of the budgeted 
revenues come from taxes (27.1%) and charges, fees and services (30.4%) (City of Sacramento, 
Finance Department, Budget, Policy and Stategic Planning Division, 2012a).  Over 80% of the 
general fund expenses are dedicated to personnel costs (City of Sacramento, Finance 
Department, Budget, Policy and Stategic Planning Division, 2012a).   
The budget supports 3,791 FTE positions (City of Sacramento, Finance Department, 
Budget, Policy and Stategic Planning Division, 2012a), of which 1,367.46 FTEs are allocated to 
the Police (841.96 FTE) and Fire Departments (525.5), and 2,424.08 FTEs are allocated to the 
other City Departments (City of Sacramento, Finance Department, Budget, Policy and Strategic 
Planning Division, 2012b).  The City of Sacramento has 17 labor unions and unrepresented units 
(City of Sacramento, Human Resources Department, n.d.). 
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The City of Sacramento participates in the Sacramento City Employee Retirement 
System (SCERS) and CalPERS (Denise Deprato, personal communication, March 12, 2012).  As 
of 1978, the SCERS plan was closed to new members from the City of Sacramento (City of 
Sacramento, Office of the City Treasurer, 2008).  There are 75 employees in the SCERS plan, of 
which 53 are active and 22 are as a result of reciprocity and vesting options (Denise Deprato, 
personal communication, March 12, 2012).  In the PERS plan there are 2,396 active 
miscellaneous employees and 1,238 active safety employees (Denise Deprato, personal 
communication, March 12, 2012).  According to the “PERS Annual Valuation Report as of June 
30, 2010”, there are 1,302 retirees and beneficiaries in the miscellaneous plan and 926 in the 
safety plan, for a total of 2,228 retired members and beneficiaries (Press Room, CalPERS Office 
of Public Affairs, personal communication, July 11, 2012).  There are 997 miscellaneous retirees 
and 262 safety employees in the SCERS plan (Denise Deprato, personal communication, March 
12, 2012).   
Employee contribution for the SCERS plan is between .68% and 9.51% (Denise Deprato, 
personal communication, March 12, 2012), depending on the employee’s age at the time of 
joining SCERS (Denise Deprato, personal communication, April 5, 2012).  The employee 
contribution for miscellaneous employees in the PERS plan is 7% and for safety employees it is 
9% (Denise Deprato, personal communication, March 12, 2012).   
The employer contribution rate for SCERS is 3.7%, for PERS miscellaneous employees 
the City’s contribution is 12.659% and the contribution for safety employee is 27.53% (Denise 
Deprato, personal communication, March 12, 2012).  For historic context, in 2009 the PERS 
employer contribution was 11.22% for miscellaneous employees and 22.58% for safety 
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employees (CalPERS, 2009).  The employee contributions, at that time, are the same as current 
contributions.   
Over the last thirty years, the City of Sacramento has made various changes and 
enhancements to the retirement benefits available to employees. Table 4 provides a breakdown 
of the benefit formulas available for current employees.  
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Table 4: City of Sacramento PERS Retirement Contract Summary 















3% @ 55 Formula for 
State Peace 
Officer/Firefighter or 






































3% @ 50 Patrol or 















Safety - Police 
 
12/30/1989 3% @ 50 Patrol or 



















3% @ 55 Formula for 
State Peace 
Officer/Firefighter or 



















3% @ 50 Patrol or 



















3% @ 55 Formula for 
State Peace 
Officer/Firefighter or 






































Prepared by: Genna Tanner, Labor Relations Analyst 
  (Denise Deprato, personal communication, March 12, 2012) 
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The benefit formula for employees in the SCERS retirement plan is dependent on their 
age at retirement.  The formulas range from a benefit of 1.1% @ 50 to 2.4% @ 60.  Table 5 
shows the complete breakdown for employees aged 50 through age 60. 	  
Table 5: Benefit formula for SCERS Employees 
MISCELLANEOUS MEMBERS                                                               
PERCENTAGE OF FINAL COMPENSATION 
Age of 
Retirement Exact 1/4 1/2 ¾ 
50 1.1000 1.1325 1.1650 1.1975 
51 1.2300 1.2625 1.2950 1.3275 
52 1.3600 1.3925 1.4250 1.4575 
53 1.4900 1.5225 1.5550 1.5875 
54 1.6200 1.6525 1.6850 1.7175 
55 1.7500 1.7825 1.8150 1.8475 
56 1.8800 1.9125 1.9450 1.9775 
57 2.0100 2.0425 2.0750 2.1075 
58 2.1400 2.1725 2.2050 2.2375 
59 2.2700 2.3025 2.3350 2.3675 
60+ 2.4000       
(Denise Deprato, personal communication, March 12, 2012) 
 
The City also offers a 401a type plan for exempt employees.  The City and employee 
contribute to the plan (City of Sacramento, Human Resources Department, n.d.). 
There are no rate plan projections available for SCERS (Denise Deprato, personal 
communication, March 12, 2012).  The current investment rate of return for the SCERS plan is 
6.5% (Denise Deprato, personal communication, March 12, 2012).   
The City of Sacramento anticipates its contribution to the PERS plan will increase as 
follows: 
Year Misc Safety 
2013 12.844% 27.781% 
2014 13.0% 28.2% 
2015 13.1% 28.6% 
(Denise Deprato, personal communication, March 12, 2012) 
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These projections do not take into account changes adopted by the PERS board to lower the 
discount rate on investment returns from 7.75% to 7.5% (CalPERS, External Affairs Branch, 
2012).  This change will “increase by 1 to 2 percent for Miscellaneous plans and 2 to 3 percent 
for Safety plans beginning Fiscal year 2013-14” (CalPERS, External Affairs Branch, 2012).  To 
soften the impact on employers, the reduction in investment rate return may be smoothed over 
two years (CalPERS, External Affairs Branch, 2012).   
The total assets under management for the SCERS plan are $301 million (Denise 
Deprato, personal communication, March 12, 2012).  The PERS “Annual Valuation Report as of 
June 30, 2010” shows that the market value of assets is $770,296,873 for the safety plan and 
$477,184,231 for the miscellaneous plan, a total value of over $1.2 billion dollars (Press Room, 
CalPERS Office of Public Affairs, personal communication, July 11, 2012).   
No additional information is available on other plan models for the City of Sacramento 
(Denise Deprato, personal communication, March 12, 2012) and only the PERS plan is available 
to employees (Denise Deprato, personal communication, March 12, 2012).  The City of 
Sacramento participates in Social Security (Denise Deprato, personal communication, March 12, 
2012).  
Compared to the political climate in the City of San Jose and the City of San Diego, the 
City of Sacramento is relatively calm.  There is no daily mention in the press of the city’s 
dealings with employee relations and other city matters.  The proximity to the state legislature 
may apply additional scrutiny to city functions, but the city appears poised to conduct reform 
efforts outside of the ballot box.   
In 2011, the City of Sacramento set the groundwork for their pension reform efforts by 
reviewing an audit report that recommended employees begin making contributions to the 
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retirement plan (Hurt, 2011).  In a recent budget study session, the Sacramento City Council 
approved the budget plan that closed the $15.7 million dollar deficit, mainly through increases in 
employee contributions to the pension plans (Lillis, 2012b).  While no documents about the City 
of Sacramento’s pension reform efforts are available (Denise Deprato, personal communication, 
March 12, 2012), the City Council and the City Manager’s office have discussed pension reform 
efforts and other options for reducing pension obligations through annual budget discussions 
(Lillis, 2011). 
Most of the pension discussions in Sacramento revolve around the employee’s required 
contributions to pension plans.  As a member of PERS, by law the employee is required to 
contribute a fixed amount to the specific pension plan (City of Sacramento, Office of the City 
Auditor, 2011).  Based on Sacramento’s plan selection, a miscellaneous employee’s contribution 
is 7% and a safety employee’s contribution is fixed at 9%.  The City may negotiate with labor 
unions and pay some or all of the employee potion of the pension contribution (City of 
Sacramento, Office of the City Auditor, 2011).  This pickup is typically referred to as “Employee 
Paid Member Contribution” or “EPMC” (Gould, 2011).  
In fiscal year 2009-2010, the EPMC for police and fire employees was 9%, EPMC for 
miscellaneous employees ranged from 3%-7% (City of Sacramento, Office of the City Auditor, 
2011).  These contribution rates, in addition to the required employer contribution, resulted in the 
City paying over $44 million dollars for employer contributions and nearly $17 million dollars in 
employee contributions (City of Sacramento, Office of the City Auditor, 2011, p. 33).  The 
auditor estimated that if employees paid 4% towards the pensions, the City could save over $86 
million dollars in a decade.  An increase in the employee contribution to 5% results in savings of 
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nearly $123 million dollars in the same time span (City of Sacramento, Office of the City 
Auditor, 2011).   
To address this audit recommendation and reduce budget expenditures, over the last two 
years the City has negotiated with the various bargaining units to decrease EPMC.  Now the 
executive managers, department heads and unrepresented employees contribute their full 7% 
towards their respective pension plans (Lillis, 2012b).  In 2011, Fire employees agreed to 
continue to defer a 5% raise, originally scheduled to take effect in 2008 and then 2012, to 2013 
and contribute 6% towards their share of pension contributions (Kalb, 2011).  These actions 
saved the city $3.5 million dollars in salary savings and $3 million dollars in pension related 
costs (Kalb, 2011).  This decrease in EPMC is being used to save Fire department jobs (Lillis, 
2012b).  Discussions with the police department did not result in any changes to the EPMC, thus 
the City continues to contribute the full 9% towards the employees’ share (Lillis, 2012b).   
City of San Diego 
The City of San Diego, located in Southern California, has a population of over 1.3 
million and is the second largest city in California (California Department of Finance, 
Demographic Research Unit, 2012).  Over 45% of the population is White, with almost 29% of 
Hispanic origin and approximately 16% Asian (US Census Bureau, 2012a).  The City covers 
over 325 square miles of area and residents have a median income of $62,480 dollars annually 
(US Census Bureau, 2012a).  
The City of San Diego is a Charter City (City of San Diego, Office of the City Clerk, 
n.d.).  The proposed fiscal year 2012-2013 budget is over $2.7 billon dollars, of which nearly 
$1.2 billion dollars is in the general fund, with just over $900 million in the Enterprise Funds 
(City of San Diego, Financial Management Department, 2012).  Similar to the City of San Jose 
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and the City of Sacramento, over 53% of the general fund revenue is generated from taxes, 
specifically property tax (33.9%) and sales tax (20.4%).  The rest of the general fund comes from 
various other revenue sources such as licenses and permits, fines, and other fees and charges 
(City of San Diego, Financial Management Department, 2012).  The proposed budget for the 
general fund includes 7,105.42 FTEs (City of San Diego, Financial Management Department, 
2012), of which 3663.74 FTEs are in the Fire-Rescue Department (1,148.89) and Police 
Department (2,514.85) (City of San Diego, Financial Management Department, 2012).  
Including the enterprise funds, the City of San Diego’s proposed budget includes funding for 
10,059.44 FTEs (City of San Diego, Financial Management Department, 2012).  These 
employees are situated is six different bargaining units (City of San Diego, Financial 
Management Department, 2012).   
The City of San Diego participates in the San Diego City Employees' Retirement System 
(SDCERS).  SDCERS also administers the retirement plans for the San Diego Port District and 
the San Diego Airport Authority (Johnny H. Tran, Esq., Personal Communication, January 30, 
2012).  As of June 30, 2011 there were a total of 7,792 active members in the SDCERS plan, of 
whom 5,498 are general members and 2,294 are safety employees (Cheiron, 2012, p. 31).  
Effective June 30, 2011, there are a total of 7,902 payees from the SDCERS system (Cheiron, 
2012, p. 32).  Payees include retired employees, disability retirement and beneficiaries.  Of those 
nearly eight thousand retirees, 4,039 are general retirees (regular – 3,618 and disability 
retirement - 421) and 2,677 are safety retirees (regular – 1,862 and disability - 815) (Cheiron, 
2012, p. 32).   
These figures do not include the participants in the Deferred retirement Option Plan 
(DrOP) program, which provides some members with a different way to accrue benefits in the 
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SDCERS plan (San Diego City Employees' Retirement System, 2011b).  The DrOP participants 
are retired from the SDCERS system, so the City and Employee no longer contribute to the plan, 
however the employee continues to work and instead, the employer and employee pay a fixed 
amount into an annual annuity.  Once the DRoP participant leaves employment, he may draw on 
the defined pension benefit and the annuity (San Diego City Employees' Retirement System, 
2011b, p. 108).  As of 2005, the City no longer offers participation in the DRoP program (San 
Diego City Employees' Retirement System, 2011b).  There are an additional 980 participants in 
the DrOP program, 554 general employees and 426 safety, as of June 30, 2011 (Cheiron, 2012, 
p. 32).  
Employee contributions depend on the participant’s age at the time he joins the SDCERS 
plan.  Effective June 30, 2011, the contribution rate for a 20 year old general employee hired on 
or after July 1, 2009 is 3.37%, while for a general employee aged 57 it is 11.06% (Cheiron, 
2012).  For police employees hired on or after July 1, 2009, the contributions rates range from 
9.97% (age 20) to 17.49% (age 49).  The rate for fire employees is not dependent on date of hire 
and ranges from 12.54% (age 20) to 17.57% (age 49); similarly, the range for lifeguards is 
between 12.45% (age 20) to 16.28% (age 49) (Cheiron, 2012).  Table 6 displays the current 
employee contribution rate matrix.  
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Table 6: SDCERS Employee Contribution Rates 
 
(Cheiron, 2012, p. 61) 
 
 
The employer contribution rate to the retirement plan is 46.64% effective June 30, 2011 
(Cheiron, 2012). 
The City of San Diego Employees’ Retirement System Charters, policies, resolutions and 
rules of the board of administration (Charters) document provides employee contribution rates 
from 1989 to present.  From 1989 to 2005, the City of San Diego employee contribution rate was 
lower for the first $400 per month and increased on the excess of $400 salary per month (San 
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Diego City Employees’ Retirement System, 2011a).  In addition the entry age to the system was 
lower, age sixteen (San Diego City Employees’ Retirement System, 2011a). To provide a more 
accurate comparison to the current employee contribution rates, Table 7 summarizes the rates 
from 2007 to 2010, as reported in the Charters document appendix (San Diego City Employees’ 
Retirement System, 2011a, pp. 313-365). 
Table 7: SDCERS Employee Contribution Rates 
 General Police Fire Lifeguard 
2007 9.18% - 14.21%  11.86% - 16.97% 11.55% - 16.66% 11.20% - 16.31% 
2008 9.18% - 14.21%  11.86% - 16.97% 11.55% - 16.66% 11.20% - 16.31% 
2009 3.37% - 11.06%* 9.97% - 17.49%* 12.54% - 17.57% 12.45% - 16.28% 
2010 3.37% - 11.06% 9.97% - 17.57% 12.54% - 17.57% 12.45% - 16.28% 
*implemented a new lower tier retirement plan for employees hired after July 25, 2009 (San 
Diego City Employees' Retirement System, 2011b) 
    
Over this time period the employer contribution increased nearly 15%, Figure 1 shows 
the employer contribution from 2003 through 2013.  
Figure 1: SDCERS City and Member Contribution Rates
 
(Cheiron, 2012, p. 8) 
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The retirement benefit formula for City of San Diego employees is calculated based on 
the age at retirement.  A vested miscellaneous employee hired after July 1, 2009, aged 55, is 
eligible for 1% times their creditable years of service times their final compensation (San Diego 
Municipal Code Section 24.0401-24.0405, 2011).  The same member who retires at age 65 is 
eligible for 2.6% times their creditable years of services times their final compensation (San 
Diego Municipal Code Section 24.0401-24.0405, 2011).  Police and fire retirement benefit 
formula are also based on age at retirement.  A police employee hired after July 1, 2009 is 
eligible for 2.5% at 50 up to 3% at 55 (San Diego Municipal Code Section 24.0401-24.0405, 
2011).  A fire employee hired after January 1, 2012 is eligible for 2.5% at 50 up to 3% at 55 (San 
Diego Municipal Code Section 24.0401-24.0405, 2011).   
The City of San Diego investment rate return assumption for the current plan is 7.5% 
(Cheiron, 2012). Based on the City’s 2011 CAFR, the SDCERS plan had approximately $5.3 
billion dollars in net assets (San Diego City Employees' Retirement System, 2011b, p. 22). 
In addition to the pension plan, the City of San Diego offers a deferred compensation 
plan to its employees (Johnny H. Tran, Esq., Personal Communication, January 30, 2012), a 457 
plan (Valerie VanDeweghe, personal communication, June 8, 2012) and at one time a 
Supplemental Pension Savings Plan (City of San Diego Pension Reform Committee, 2004).  The 
Supplemental Pension Savings Plan was for general employees (City of San Diego Pension 
Reform Committee, 2004) and required to participants to contribute at least 3.5% of their salary 
after-tax, which was matched by the City.  The SPSP plan was eliminated in 2009 for new 
employees (City of San Diego, 2010).  
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City of San Diego employees do not participate in Social Security, retirees with prior 
service in Social Security are subject to Social Security Windfall provisions (Valerie 
VanDeweghe, personal communication, June 8, 2012).   
The City implemented a new lower retirement tier for miscellaneous and police 
employees hired after July 25, 2009 (San Diego City Employees' Retirement System, 2011b) but 
the City’s projections still indicate that the City’s contribution to pensions will increase over the 
next three years to nearly 47% of payroll (Cheiron, 2012).  Following the high of 47%, the 
actuarial audit suggests a gradual decrease to approximately 11% of payroll, until the rates again 
increase to levels similar to today.  Table 8 shows the potential pension obligations for the next 
three decades, but the auditors caution that these projections are based on current assumptions 
and rates of earnings that may not be sustainable (Cheiron, 2012).  In essence, what the chart 
shows is that the pension contribution rates are highly variable.   
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Table 8: City of San Diego Retirement Plan Projections
 
(Cheiron, 2012)  
  
One indication of the difference in political climate in the City of San Diego and the City 
of San Jose is in the language of their ballot measures.  The City of San Jose was required by a 
Superior Court decision to change the ballot language from “Pension Reform” to more neutral 
language (McDonough, et al. vs City of San Jose, et al., 2012).  In the City of San Diego the 
pension proposition survived initial lawsuits, which could have stricken the item from the ballot 
(Gustafson, 2012d).  The initial ruling was later overturned, and the City was forced to return the 
matter to the administrative process.    
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Also, processes between the City of San Diego and SDCERS are subject to additional 
scrutiny.  The 2011 SDCERS administrative audit report found that, generally, the administrative 
expenses for the agency were on par with other similarly situated pension plan organizations; 
“[h]owever, the contentious history between SDCERS and the City has uniquely impacted its 
current operating environment. Expenses are higher than peers largely due to litigation and 
efforts to correct prior, well-publicized problems that enabled the City to underfund the pension 
for years” (City of San Diego, Office of the City Auditor, 2011, p. 3).  The SDCERS plan also 
spends a significant amount of money on indemnifying individual board members against 
personal lawsuits filed against them in their official capacity (City of San Diego, Office of the 
City Auditor, 2011).  These examples typify the political atmosphere of the City of San Diego as 
it works to make changes to its pension plans.   
As previously mentioned, the City of San Diego created a pension plan reform committee 
to address the pension short fall and to make recommendations on potential changes to the 
retirement system.  The pension plan reform committee released a final report, and other 
supplemental documents, during their study of City of San Diego pension plan and options for 
changing the plan.  Also, with a pension reform ballot measure on the June 2012 primary ballot, 
there have been numerous documents in support of and opposition to the measure.  The San 
Diego Proposition B ballot initiative eliminates the db plan for all future city employees, except 
police officers, and implements a dc plan instead (Gustafson, 2012b).  The city council has the 
option of allowing police officers to enroll in the db plan or the dc plan (San Diego County 
Registrar of Voters, 2012).  In addition, the employer and employee will share equally in the 
costs for the db plan, and the city’s contribution to the new dc plan is capped at 9.2% for 
miscellaneous employees and 11% for sworn employees (San Diego County Registrar of Voters, 
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2012).  For current employees, the ballot measure limits the pensionable salaries used in 
retirement calculations for five or six years (Gustafson, 2012a).  The limit on pensionable 
salaries generates most of the retirement plan savings (Gustafson, 2012c).  The salary freeze 
could be lifted by a two-thirds majority of the city council (San Diego County Registrar of 
Voters, 2012).  Subject to meet and confer with unions, the ballot proposition prohibits felons 
from collecting pension benefits and requires the City to publish retirement payments annually 
(San Diego County Registrar of Voters, 2012).   
Initial reports indicated the pension ballot measure would save nearly $950 million 
dollars in the next three decades (Gustafson, 2012b), however, according to the analysis done by 
the City’s Independent Auditor, this savings figure depends almost entirely on salary freezes 
included in the measure and not the change to the 401a style program (Gustafson, 2012c).  Based 
on these findings the City Independent Auditor refused to endorse the fiscal impact statement 
provided to voters because the, “savings estimate relies on the unpredictable actions of future 
city councils and ignores the high likelihood of a legal challenge by labor that could block or 
delay implementation of a freeze” (Gustafson, 2012c).  If the city were to rely solely on the cost 
of implementing the new pension plan it appears the change from a db plan to the dc plan for 
new employees would actually cost the city $13 million dollars over 30 years (Luna, 2012).  
Additionally, the city’s labor unions argue that provisions of the measure circumvented the 
required negotiation process and filed an unfair labor practice charge against the city.   
The Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), which hears these types of cases, 
initially found that the city potentially broke the law, scheduled an administrative hearing and 
sued to keep the measure from the June ballot.  PERB lost the case in the lower court and the 
measure went on the ballot.  Despite these potential difficulties with the ballot initiative, it 
Page 49 of 85 
passed with 66% of the vote (Gustafson, 2012d).  PERB pursued an appeal, and on June 19th, 
2012 the appeals court ruled that PERB has the proper jurisdiction to determine if there is an 
unfair labor practice and to decide the legality of the City of San Diego’s Proposition B 
(Gustafson, 2012d).  Now that the matter is back with PERB, the administrative hearing and 
decision could be completed in a matter of months, but the decision can be appealed “all the way 
up to the state Supreme Court” (Gustafson, 2012d).  Given the back and forth nature already 
displayed in the last few months, it is very likely the final decision could take place years in the 
future (Gustafson, 2012d).  Regardless of the potential to overturn the ballot measure, the ruling 
that PERB had jurisdiction does not preclude the city from implementing the provisions of 
Proposition B (Gustafson, 2012d), unless a judge orders a stay.   
On July 11, 2012, a Superior Court judge issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) and 
ordered the City of San Diego not to implement provisions of Proposition B until after July 27, 
2012 (Orr, 2012b).  On July 13, 2012, the TRO was amended to exclude non-union employees 
(City News Service, 2012).  The legal landscape is constantly changing and the California 
Supreme Court has indicated an interest in the San Diego ballot measure, requesting information 
from both parties (Orr, 2012a).  According to Orr, this interest could mean that the California 
Supreme Court may weigh in on the matter prior to the PERB hearing, decide to send the matter 
back to appeals court or hear it (Orr, 2012a).  The uncertainty in implementing the voter 
approved plan caused Moody, a credit rating company, to issue a “credit negative” report for San 
Diego, which could impact the city’s credit rating in the future (Gustafson, 2012e).   
ANALYSIS 
 
Based on these findings, clearly there is a problem with public sector pension plans. The 
underlying reasons for the pension plan shortfalls in San Jose and San Diego are similar: pension 
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enhancements given during labor negotiations without thorough analysis of the long-term costs, 
and investment portfolios that underperformed relative to the accepted industry estimates of the 
time of 7.75% increase in value per year.  However, each city for which findings were collected 
has its unique challenges.   
The City of Sacramento’s pension reform discussion revolves around their current budget 
deficits.  Of the three agencies in the benchmarking study, the City of Sacramento is the only one 
that pays the employer contribution to the retirement plan and some or all of the employee 
contribution to the retirement plan.  In the short term, the focus on negotiating with employees 
regarding the employee portion of pension contribution will save the City of Sacramento money.   
In some ways, Sacramento’s pension discussions are many years behind the reform 
efforts in the City of San Diego and the City of San Jose.  This is probably because, as a 
participant in the PERS system, the City of Sacramento is constrained by the regulations 
surrounding PERS membership.  Ultimately, it is the State of California that can make changes 
to the entire PERS system (Liebert, Cassidy, Whitmore, 2012).  The City can institute a second 
tier with a lower benefit for new employees, which would reduce employer and employee costs.  
Some jurisdictions have explored options to leave PERS membership, but this can be costly.  
The City of Lincoln, another PERS member, discovered it would cost the City between $60 to 
$80 million dollars to leave the PERS system (Dumm, 2012).  In contrast, their annual 
contribution to PERS is less than $2 million (Dumm, 2012). 
Two of the main culprits in the pension plan problem for the City of San Jose are the 
retroactive pension plan increases given since 1965 (City of San Jose, Office of the Independent 
Auditor, 2010) and the annual cost of living adjustments (COLA) (City of San Jose, Office of the 
Independent Auditor, 2010).  According to the audit report, 26% to 28% of the cost of the 
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pension plans can be attributed to the guaranteed COLAs (City of San Jose, Office of the 
Independent Auditor, 2010, p. 46).  These changes, and actuarial assumptions that 
underestimated longevity after retirement, contribute to the pension problems for the City.  The 
City of San Jose’s shortfall demonstrated that inaccurate actuarial projections can have a 
significant impact on pension costs.  Over the course of one budget cycle, the City of San Jose 
pension contribution in FY12-13 for the Police and Fire plan decreased from a projection of 
$160 million to $105 million, a difference of $55 million dollars (Figone, 2011c), driven 
partially by the rebound in the stock portion of the pension fund’s portfolio.  Most of the cost 
difference is attributed to the reduction in force and the10% reduction in current compensation 
(Figone, 2011c).  This did not stop the pension reform efforts; it just added another layer of 
difficulty in demonstrating that the reform efforts were necessary.   
In the City of San Diego, most of the unfunded pension liability was due primarily to 
enhancements of benefits provided between 1996 and 2003 and investment losses during that 
same time period (City of San Diego Pension Reform Committee, 2004).  Those pension 
enhancements were directly related to City of San Diego’s decision to systematically and 
deliberately underfund the pension plan in order to avoid raising taxes or decreasing city services 
(Lowenstein, 2008).  In order to avoid making payments to the pension plan, and use the money 
for city services instead as a kind of internal loan, the city had to have approval from the 
SDCERS board and the labor unions.   
Initially, the SDCERS board resisted the underfunding scheme but was convinced to 
approve a plan to defer payments to a later date.  At that later date, the city would be required to 
make a balloon payment if the plan assets fell below a certain point, a so-called “trigger” 
(Lowenstein, 2008, p. 170).  With this payment, the city would effectively be caught up with 
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funding (Lowenstein, 2008).  The city provided the unions with enhanced benefits packages in 
order to get approval of the change in funding (Lowenstein, 2008).   
The plan worked, benefits were increased and funding to the plan decreased.  Then came 
the trigger, and questions about the legality of the moves were asked by some council members, 
city staff and pension board members.  Through a series of lawsuits and settlement agreements, 
the city was required to make payments to the plan, but by that point, the unfunded liabilities 
were already at $1.4 billion dollars (Lowenstein, 2008).  The political fallout led to the mayor’s 
resignation, and conflict-of-interest filings against six former pension board members and three 
city officials (Lowenstein, 2008, p. 214).  
The reform efforts in the City of San Jose and the City of San Diego are under legal 
challenge.  Taking into account the millions of dollars required for both sides to litigate the ballot 
measure, it will be months or even years before either city realizes any savings.  During that 
time, if the trends for the last decade are any indication, the employer contributions will continue 
to increase.  San Jose and San Diego are gambling that the changes put into place will stand, and 
that they will realize millions of dollars in savings necessary to balance the cities’ budgets.  
Sacramento’s pension plan changes are not under legal scrutiny, so they will achieve the 
projected savings as anticipated.  However, the changes in Sacramento do not address the 
underlying premise that employer contributions to pension plans are increasing.   
To compare the reform efforts, it may be useful to focus on the employer and employee 
(if applicable) contribution to the pension plans, before and after the proposed changes.  Table 9, 
10 and 11 provide a matrix of current and proposed employer and employee contribution rates, 
for miscellaneous, police and fire employees, expressed as a percentage of payroll. 
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Table 9: Current and proposed employer and miscellaneous employee pension contribution rates  
 Current Employer Proposed / 
Potential 
Employer ** 
Current Employee Proposed / 
Potential 
Employee 
San Jose 35.50% 6.9% to 7.95%  11.20% 6.9% to 7.95%  
San Diego 46.64% 9.2% 3.37%-11.06% Unknown 
Sacramento 12.56% - 15.56%* 12.56% 4%-7% 7% 
* 12.56% + 3% (Employer contribution plus EPMC)  
** Data for 2nd tier for new employees in San Jose and San Diego.  
 
Table 10: Current and proposed employer and police employee pension contribution rates  
 Current Employer Proposed  / 
Potential 
Employer 
Current Employee Proposed  / 
Potential 
Employee 
San Jose 56.90% n/a – pending 
arbitration for 2nd 
tier 
17.47% n/a – pending 
arbitration for 2nd 
tier 
San Diego 46.64% n/a – new plan 
does not apply to 
police 
employees** 
9.97%-17.49% n/a – new plan 
does not apply to 
police 
employees** 
Sacramento 36.53%*  27.53% 0% 9% 
* 27.53%+9% (Employer Contribution + EPMC) 
** City Council has option to enroll police employees in the defined benefit plan or the defined 
contribution plan.  
 
Table 11: Current and proposed employer and fire employee pension contribution rates  
 Current 
Employer 
Proposed  / 
Potential 
Employer 
Current Employee Proposed  / 
Potential 
Employee 
San Jose 56.32% n/a – pending 
arbitration for 2nd 
tier 
15.62% n/a – pending 
arbitration for 
2nd tier 
San Diego 46.64% 11% 12.54%-17.57% Unknown 
Sacramento 30.53%* 27.53% 6% 9% 
*27.53%+3% (Employer Contribution + EPMC) 
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Some of these rates are subject to changes as actuarial assumptions for db plans are 
refined, but clearly the new tiers will save the cities money.  However, these new tiers do not 
address the amount that the pension contributions will increase once the existing db plans are 
closed to new employees.   
Social Security in Retirement 
One factor that does not receive much mention in the pension reform efforts is the impact 
on Social Security earnings for employees who earn a public sector pension.  Government 
employees who will collect a pension from public agencies that do not pay into Social Security, 
and have worked at private sector or other jobs that pay into Social Security long enough to earn 
Social Security benefits, are subject to the Social Security Windfall Elimination Provision 
(Social Security Administration, 2012a).  In order to be eligible for Social Security benefits in 
retirement, employees must earn “social security credits”.  The total number of credits required is 
dependent on the employee’s birth year.  Currently, employees born after 1929 must earn 40 
credits, which is equivalent to 10 years of work for an employer contributing to Social Security 
(Social Secuirty Administration, 2012b).   
For those employees who have paid into Social Security long enough to be eligible for 
benefits, Social Security income is calculated through a three part formula against the 
employee’s average monthly income.  The average monthly income is based on the employee’s 
lifetime earnings (for social security covered employers) and various factors and index 
multipliers based on their year of birth, age at retirement and retirement year (Social Security 
Administration, Office of Retirement and Disability Policy, 2012).   
To determine the Social Security retirement benefit, “the first $767 of average monthly 
earnings is multiplied by 90 percent; the next $3,857 by 32 percent; and the remainder by 15 
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percent. The sum of the three amounts equals the total monthly payment amount” (Social 
Security Administration, 2012a) up to a maximum amount of $2,513 for a worker retiring at age 
66 in 2012. (Social Security On-Line, 2012)  After 1990, for those employees drawing a public 
sector pension who reach Social Security retirement age (62), the 90% in the first part of the 
formula is adjusted down to 40%, unless the employee has 30 or more years of substantial 
earnings covered by Social Security payments (Social Security Administration, 2012a).   
In order to earn substantial income, employees must pay into Social Security; this is not 
possible for those public sector employees not participating in Social Security.  An example 
provided by the City of San Jose FCERS website shows that an employee subject to the Windfall 
Provision could see a reduction of Social Security income between 15.85%-35.54% (age 65 in 
1995) to 16.6%-37.56% (age 62 in 1995) (City of San Jose, Department of Retirement Services, 
2007).  The Social Security Administration offers a caveat: that Social Security benefit cannot be 
reduced by “more than one-half of the amount of your pension that is based on earnings after 
1956 on which you did not pay Social Security taxes” (Social Security Administration, 2012a).  
Legality of Pension Reform 
The ballot measures in San Jose and San Diego are going to be the testing ground for 
pension reform efforts in the State.  Court rulings in California paved the way for the protection 
of pension benefits.  In the so-called “ ‘California rule’, pension benefits are treated as 
contractual in nature, and can’t be reduced once the employee has begun working for the state” 
(Monahan, 2012).  However, Monahan argues that the courts should revisit the precedent, and 
closely review the legislative intent to determine if the cities intended to make the provisions of 
the pension benefit binding for all future situations (Monahan, 2012).    
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Already, there have been four lawsuits filed in the City of San Jose on the pension reform 
ballot measure, one that challenged the actual language of the measure, one filed by the city and 
two suits by the police and fire unions.  There are two ongoing legal matters in the City of San 
Diego.  
The City of San Jose’s outside counsel, Mayers, Nave, provided an opinion that the 
City’s charter amendment, through Measure B – the Sustainable Retirement and Compensation 
Act, is “defensible against potential legal challenges” (Doyle R., 2012).  They advise that the San 
Jose City Charter reserves the right for the city council to change the retirement plan at any time 
and that the Charter is silent on payment of the unfunded liability (Doyle R., 2012).  The city 
council also added provisions to the Charter that permit employees to make greater contributions 
to the pension plan (Doyle R., 2012).  This silence and the Charter provisions may allow the city 
to prevail in the court cases against the measure.   
The legal opinion further indicates that the city has full control over setting compensation 
rates for employees, and the council is within its authority to increase or, in the case of the 
pension measure, decrease employee compensation without impacting vested rights (Doyle R.  
2012).  However, the legal opinion cautions that the city may have “created the expectation, 
through its historical practices, that it will pay for all unfunded liabilities, despite the contrary 
provisions of the City Code and the union agreements” (Doyle R., 2012).  For this reason, the 
ballot measure has a provision that allows the city to implement portions of the act that are not 
challenged or struck down by the courts (Doyle R., 2012).  
In her article “Statues as Contracts? The ‘California Rule’ and its Impact on Public 
Pension Reform” (2011) Monahan argues that disallowing public entities to change pension 
plans on a prospective basis is contrary to contract law that requires “clear and unambiguous 
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evidence that the legislature intended to bind itself” (Monahan, 2011).  One key to determine if 
the measures will stand in San Jose and San Diego, is the three part contract test Monahan (2012) 
alludes to, 1) the test helps determines if a contract exists, 2) if the action taken by the legislative 
body impaired the contract, and finally, 3) if the impairment was required for some other valid 
and important public purpose (Monahan, 2011).  If the jurisdictions can prove that the contract 
intent is non-binding, and the changes are required for the public good, they may be able to 
implement all the provision of the measures.   
Some jurisdictions have successfully defended pension plan change ballot measures 
through the courts.  Recently, the City of Menlo Park’s ballot measure was upheld under judicial 
review (Brundage, 2012).  The Menlo Park measure is significantly different from the measures 
contemplated by the City of San Jose and the City of San Diego.  The Menlo Park ballot measure 
introduced a second retirement tier with a higher retirement age, lower benefit formula and 
required any future benefit enhancements to be approved by a simple majority of voters 
(Brundage, 2012).  The unions had argued the limit on benefit enhancement would prevent 
Menlo Park from bargaining in good faith, but the courts disagreed and allowed the measure to 
stand (Brundage, 2012).   
The City of Pacific Grove’s 2010 ballot measure caps the city’s contribution to pension 
plans at 10%, and prohibits the city council from enhancing benefits which create a long-term 
debt or financial liability without voter approval (Miller & Cuneo, 2012). It is currently under 
administrative and judicial review (Urevich, 2010) (Howe, 2010).  A sub-committee of the 
Pacific Grove City Council is also reviewing the approved ballot measure (Parsons, 2012).  
Despite these legal challenges and favorable rulings, there are other ways local public entities 
may change pension obligations.   
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Collective Bargaining and Pensions 
It appears a more effective method to make changes to current employee pensions is at 
the bargaining table.  Management and union already bargain on the terms and conditions of 
employment, and jurisdictions such as the City of San Carlos and Sacramento County have 
multiple tiered retirement systems, which have gradually decreased the jurisdictions’ pension 
liabilities (Bay Area Employee Relations Servies, n.d.).  Changing the employee pension plans 
prospectively could be a legal grey area, (Monahan, 2011) but this change maybe easier to 
negotiate and communicate than legislation that is imposed through ballot measures or State 
mandates.   
Other options such as Governor Brown’s twelve point pension proposal, which appeared 
to be losing ground in legislative circles, may come to fruition based on negotiations in the 
legislative cycle (Seipel & Harmon, 2012).  The Governor’s original plan provided a 
comprehensive way to create sustainable pension and health plans (Brown, 2011).  Specifically, 
it called for the employee and the employer to share equally in pension costs, creating a hybrid 
plan for new employees which would blend db and dc plans, increasing the retirement age for 
new employees, reducing the opportunity for pension spiking by requiring final compensation in 
the benefit formula to be the average annual compensation over a three year period, and 
disallowing special pays to be included in pensionable income.  Additionally, the plan would 
impact current employees by limiting their option to return to the same job after retirement, 
prohibiting felons from collecting pension benefits, and employees would not be able to purchase 
service credit to artificially enhance their pension benefits.  The Governor’s plan eliminates 
provisions for jurisdictions to provide retroactive pension increases and would not allow public 
agencies to suspend annual pension contributions.  Finally, the plan would increase the fiduciary 
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oversight of the pension board and increase the years of service required for employees to obtain 
retiree medical benefits (Brown, 2011).  These changes would be implemented at the State level, 
with the Governor encouraging local jurisdictions to enact these same changes.  Business leaders 
have also expressed support of the Governor’s plan and urge passage of comprehensive pension 
plan reform to control pension costs (Guardino & Wundeman, 2012).   
The Legislative Analyst’s Office reviewed the Governor’s plan, and believes it is an 
“excellent starting point” (Taylor, 2011, p. 2) but that “it leaves many questions unanswered” 
(Taylor, 2011, p. 2).  The LAO’s analysis pointed out several areas of the plan that may require 
additional legal scrutiny (Taylor, 2011), similar to the measures in San Jose and San Diego. The 
LAO report asks, was the legislative intent clear and is a contract provision being abridged 
(Taylor, 2011) with the proposed changes.  The analysis indicates that the proposal “probably 
would not produce much short-term budgetary savings for state government and many local 
governments, but they would produce substantial long-term savings” (Taylor, 2011, pp. 27-28), 
if the details of the plan are right (Taylor, 2011).   
The LAO analysis cautioned the legislature to take time to create a workable pension 
plan. This analysis was issued in October 2011 and now, ten months later, the legislature is 
working out the details of the plan (Seipel & Harmon, 2012).  There is concern from the Charter 
Cities, such as San Jose and San Diego, that their approved ballot measures will be negatively 
impacted by the State’s pension reform legislation.  Mayor Reed of San Jose and Mayor Sanders 
of San Diego both sent letters to the legislature expressing their concerns and seeking assurance 
that their pension measures would stand without interference (Seipel & Harmon, 2012).   
Legislators responded and are quoted as saying that the legislative intent is not to impact 
the Charter Cities with their own pension plans (Seipel & Harmon, 2012).  However, Charter 
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Cites which participate in the PERS plan, such as Sacramento, will be bound by the changes to 
the pension plan (Seipel & Harmon, 2012).  Early reports indicate that the revised state plan 
would include raising the retirement age, capping the maximum allowable pension, eliminating 
air time provisions and opportunities for spiking pensions, but the revisions did not include 
language about a hybrid plan or how specifically to increase the retirement age and employee 
contribution (Yamamura, 2012).  The final details and impact will not be known until voted on in 
legislative session.  As of July 10, 2012, it appears statewide pension reform efforts will not 
appear on the November 2012 ballot (Ortiz, 2012).   
Pension Plan Success 
The difficulties faced by the cities of San Jose and San Diego with their pension plans are 
not necessarily because they run their own retirement plans.  The County of Sacramento has its 
own plan, the Sacramento County Employees’ Retirement System.  The Sacramento County 
Employees’ Retirement System plan has over $6 billion dollars in assets and over 24,000 
members (Sacramento County Employees' Retirement System News and Developments, n.d.).  
The plan is 87% funded and saw double-digit investment returns in the last two fiscal years 
(Sacramento County Employees' Retirement System News and Developments, n.d.).  Another 
plan that is doing well financially is the County of San Mateo’s plan, the San Mateo County 
Employees' Retirement Association (SamCERA).  SamCERA has $2.3 billion dollars in assets 
(San Mateo County Employees' Retirement Association, 2011, p. 21) and earned 23.92% on 
investments in the last fiscal year (San Mateo County Employees' Retirement Association, 2011, 
p. 11).  The annual assumed investment rate of 7.75% is somewhat higher than the other 
retirement systems discussed (San Mateo County Employees' Retirement Association, 2011, p. 
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12).  The system has a funded ratio of 74.1% (San Mateo County Employees' Retirement 
Association, 2011, p. 24) 
The San Mateo County retirement plan has five retirement tiers for miscellaneous 
employees (Penny Calinawan, personal communication, July 2, 2012).  The tier an employee is 
eligible for is dependent on when the employee entered the system.  Tier 1 applies to employees 
hired before 1980 and offers a retirement benefit of 2% at 61.25, and is not integrated with 
Social Security.  The employer contribution to this tier is 29.44% (Penny Calinawan, personal 
communication, July 2, 2012).  There are two parts to the employee contribution: part one is 
dependent on the employee’s age and ranges between 4.22% and 8.92% (San Mateo County 
Employees’ Retirement Association, 2011a).  The system requires the employee to pay half the 
amount of COLA.  The contribution for the COLA is .91% to 1.93% (San Mateo County 
Employees’ Retirement Association, 2011a).  The total employee contribution ranges from 
5.13% to 10.85%.  These contribution amounts apply to tiers 1, 3, 4 and 5 (San Mateo County 
Employees’ Retirement Association, 2011a).   
Tier 2 is for employees hired between July 7, 1980 and July 12, 1997. It offers a benefit 
formula of 2% at 55, which is not integrated with Social Security.  The employer contribution is 
29.34% (Penny Calinawan, personal communication, July 2, 2012).   
The third tier, introduced in 1993, is integrated with Social Security.  Because the plan 
option is integrated with Social Security, the benefit formula is dependent on the employees’ 
income with the County and their earned Social Security benefit (San Mateo County Employees’ 
Retirement Association, 2011a).  This plan option is for employees who did not want to 
contribute to the pension plan; the employer contribution is 26.20%.  After a certain time 
employees may transfer to a higher benefit plan.  The plans open to the transferring employee is 
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dependent on their date of hire and years of service (Penny Calinawan, personal communication, 
July 2, 2012).  Only 4% of eligible employees elect the third tier plan (San Mateo County 
Employees’ Retirement Association, 2011a).   
The fourth tier, a 2% at 55.5 benefit formula was implemented in 2005, and applies to 
employees hired on or after July 13, 1997.  This tier is not integrated with Social Security and 
carries an employer contribution rate of 28.21% (Penny Calinawan, personal communication, 
July 2, 2012).  The final tier for miscellaneous employees has a benefit formula of 1.725% at 58, 
and is for employees hired on or after July 10, 2011.  Employees may transfer to Plan 4 after 10 
years of service.  The employer contribution to this plan is 27.38% (Penny Calinawan, personal 
communication, July 2, 2012).  
For safety employees, SamCERA has four retirement tiers, and similar to the 
miscellaneous plans, the employee contributions vary by age of entry in the plan.  Depending on 
the plan selected, the employee may pay the employee contribution, plus a COLA rate and a cost 
share.  The employee contribution ranges from 5.50% to 9.34%, the COLA rate ranges from 
2.07% to 3.52%, plus a cost share contribution of 3.50% (San Mateo County Employees’ 
Retirement Association, 2011b).  The total contribution for employee then ranges from 7.32% to 
16.36% (San Mateo County Employees’ Retirement Association, 2011b) 
Tier 1 is for safety employees hired on or before 1980, provides a 2% at 50 benefit 
formula, the employee rate is 76.20% and the employer paid member contribution is an 
additional 6.12% (Penny Calinawan, personal communication, July 2, 2012).  Tier 2 provides a 
3% at 55 benefit formula and is for employees hired between July 7, 1980 and July 12, 1997 
(Penny Calinawan, personal communication, July 2, 2012).  The employer contribution is a 
slightly lower rate of 72.25% and EPMC of 6.12% (Penny Calinawan, personal communication, 
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July 2, 2012).  Tier 3 only applies to miscellaneous employees.  Tier 4 provides 3% at 50, was 
implemented on January 2, 2005, and may be used by employees hired on or after July 13, 1997 
(Penny Calinawan, personal communication, July 2, 2012).  This tier has an employer 
contribution of 70.09% and EPMC of 5.86% (Penny Calinawan, personal communication, July 
2, 2012).  Tier five is a two part tier, implemented just six months ago, and allows safety 
management employees hired on or after January, 8, 2012 to select one of two retirement tier 
options: 1) 3% at 55 with a 5% cost share or 2) 2% at 50 with no cost share (Penny Calinawan, 
personal communication, July 2, 2012).  The employer contribution rates for this newly 
implemented plan are not available.  
Many jurisdictions in the Bay Area have implemented multiple retirement tiers.  Of the 
64 agencies reported by the Bay Area Employee Relations Service, as of May 2012, almost half 
of the agencies have multiple retirement tiers (Bay Area Employee Relations Servies, n.d.).  The 
three jurisdictions studied in this research have not fully implemented multiple retirement tiers in 
an effort to reduce pension costs or manage unfunded liabilities.  Technically, the City of 
Sacramento has two retirement tiers because there are still 75 employees in the SCERS plan 
(Denise Deprato, personal communication, March 12, 2012).  However that plan has been closed 
to new members since 1978 (City of Sacramento, Office of the City Treasurer, 2008), well 
before the pension enhancements and market downturns discussed in this paper.  The City of San 
Diego also has two tiered retirement plans, but considering the extreme difficulty the city faced 
with the pension scandal, the second tiers implemented in 2009 and 2012 have not greatly 
impacted the state of unfunded liability or employer contributions.  The City of San Jose also has 
two tiers of retirement for safety employees, but the benefit for employees who retire after 2008 
is greater than the benefit for employees who retired before 2008.  The employer contribution to 
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the pre 2008 plan is 25.220% compared to the contribution rate of 56.320% (Penny Calinawan, 
personal communication, July 2, 2012).  The recently approved second tier for miscellaneous 
employees is pending implementation.   
Another option to reduce unfunded liability is to institute a reduction in salary.  
According to San Diego Council Member Sherri Lightner, a 6% decrease in salary at the City of 
San Diego lead to a $100 million dollar decrease in unfunded liability (City of San Diego, 
Councilmember Sherri Lightner, Council District 1, n.d.).  This is what happened in the City of 
San Jose.  In fiscal year 2010-2011, the City implemented or imposed, across the board, salary 
reductions for nearly all employees (City of San Jose, Office of Employee Relations, 2012).  The 
City saw the projected FY 2012-2013 budget deficit of $80.5 million dollars (Figone, 2011c) 
turn into a $9 million dollar budget surplus (City of San Jose, Office of the City Manager, n.d.), 
and the required pension contributions for police and fire employees drop from $160 million 
dollars to $105 million dollars (Figone, 2011c).   
Liabilities of Pension Reform 
The City of San Jose’s pension measure fail-safe mechanism of requiring current 
employees to contribute more towards unfunded liabilities or see a reduction in salary will save 
the City money, but there will be a cost.  Employees may elect to leave City employment rather 
than sustain nearly 30% in pay cuts.  That is one of the dangers in reducing salaries to a point 
that the jurisdiction is no longer competitive with surrounding employers.  This need to be 
comparable with surrounding jurisdictions is one of the factors that led many jurisdictions to 
enhance their pension plans (Lowenstein, 2005).  It would be unfortunate if the pension fix leads 
to another situation that needs to be “fixed”.   
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Another option for jurisdictions is to do nothing.  It is possible that public pension 
systems’ unfunded liabilities will decrease if the stock market continues to gain.  According to a 
recent report by the US Census Bureau, pension holdings increased 5.6% in the first quarter of 
2012.  This increase resulted in $179.2 billion dollars added to pension funds in the United States 
(Lambert, 2012).  Information about these gains is offset by the news that Moody estimates 
pension debt to be over $2 trillion dollars, triple the amount estimated in 2010 (Gralla, 2012).  
This debt amount is based on using a lower investment earnings rate (5.5%) than generally used 
by public sector agencies (Gralla, 2012).  Every percentage point difference between the reduced 
discount rate of 5.5%, and the assumptions for the plan equals approximately a thirteen percent 
increase in the plan liability (Gralla, 2012).  “For example, a plan with a $10 billion liability 
based on an 8 percent discount rate would see that amount leap to $13.56 billion if a 5.5 percent 
rate were used” (Gralla, 2012).  Another factor that can impact reporting of unfunded liability are 
GASB reporting requirements.   
In June 2012, GASB released two new accounting standards for pension boards.  The 
first “requires governments providing defined benefit pensions to recognize their long-term 
obligation for pension benefits as a liability for the first time, and to more comprehensively and 
comparably measure the annual costs of pension benefits” (Oney, 2012).  The financial reports 
will have to include detailed information about the plan, such as benefits provided, assumptions 
used to calculate liabilities, any changes to the benefits and how changes (up or down) in the 
discount rate will impact the total liability of the system (Governmental Accounting Standards 
Board of the Financial Accounting Foundation, 2012).  These changes are intended to make it 
easier for interested parties to compare pension plans and more fully inform the public of the 
financial obligations of each jurisdiction (Governmental Accounting Standards Board of the 
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Financial Accounting Foundation, 2012).  So even by doing nothing, jurisdictions still can see 
their unfunded liabilities change dramatically.   
CONCLUSION 
 
Two years ago, a challenge in jurisdictions advocating pension reform was getting 
employees and their unions to acknowledge that there was a problem that needed to be solved.   
Acknowledgement of the problem requires trust and communication between the employees, 
unions and employers, and everyone must trust the actuarial presentation and administrative 
oversight.   
The stock market losses of the 2008 Recession led to increased payments by cities’ 
General Funds to maintain the stability of the pension fund, which led to a dramatic loss of 
public services like library hours and police patrol positions.  The residents of cities reacted 
negatively to the loss of services required to maintain public pensions, which they perceived as 
too generous.  As unemployment rose and foreclosures increased, resentment over public 
employee salary and benefit packages and stable employment was expressed by residents and tax 
payers. They demanded reform. 
Now, regardless of the amount of trust and communication, voters have clearly spoken 
and helped to move the matter to the public forefront.  By overwhelmingly approving ballot 
measures that modify pension plans for public employees, employees can no longer avoid 
changes to the pension plan, but perhaps they can take an active role in shaping the changes.   
It appears the City of Sacramento’s approach as a member of PERS is the best.  The 
approach provides for actual savings now and will not require extensive legal wrangling.  Once 
the package has been negotiated between the city and the unions, it can be implemented.  
However, this approach does not address the current unfunded liability.  Presumably, the 
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unfunded liability will continue to grow, unless the plans’ economic gains are significant, and the 
usage is significantly lower.   
The City of San Jose and City of San Diego, as Charter Cities with their own pension 
systems, have considerably more flexibility in the options the jurisdictions can adopt.  But until 
the legal issues are resolved the cities will not realize real savings.  If these cities are able to win 
their legal arguments, not only will it fundamentally change the way retirement benefits are 
provided to public employees, but more importantly it will be decades before the public knows if 
these changes actually resulted in measureable cost savings.  By that time, it is possible that 
another matter will occupy the minds of the public.   
Lowenstein said it best: “pensions are a test of political character.  They are a bargain 
with the future; a statement about the value that a city places on its workers. When the bargain is 
corrupted, the whole of society is affected.  Its sense of equity is destroyed, and with it the 
people’s faith in their leaders and their institutions” (Lowenstein, 2008, pp. 195-196).  This 
statement is particularly true today, where pension reform ballot efforts in San Jose and San 
Diego passed easily, but leave behind greater uncertainty and fractured relationships between the 
cities, their employees and the public they serve.  The pension landscape is changing every day, 
it is clear that something must be done, but the specific course of action is highly dependent on 
the political will of the electorate, the legislative body and rulings of the judiciary. 
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